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1 In the last fifteen years, John Dewey’s early philosophy received considerable attention.
John Shook’s Dewey’s Empirical Theory of Knowledge and Reality, Jim Good’s The Search for
“Unity in Diversity”:  the “Permanent Deposit” of  Hegel  in John Dewey’s  Philosophy, Donald
Morse’s Faith in Life: John Dewey’s Early Philosophy, on the top of many articles, critical
editions,  and reviews:  all  these texts have contributed to a better understanding of
many important aspects of Dewey’s early thought. The aspects with which those pieces
of  scholarship  are  concerned  reflect,  quite  naturally,  the  trends  of  interest  in
contemporary  pragmatist  debates.  It  is  not  strange,  therefore,  that  relatively  little
attention has been paid to Dewey’s logical theory. James Scott Johnston’s new book,
significantly entitled John Dewey’s Earlier Logical Theory, aims to fill this gap in Dewey
scholarship: its goal is that of outlining the process of development of Dewey’s theory
of logic, from his first articles to his last great book, the Logic: Theory of Inquiry.
2 The book comprises an introduction and seven chapters. Of these, the first two – the
best part of the book, in my opinion – are devoted to analyzing what the author calls
‘Dewey’s  Logical  Education,’  that is,  the “context of  Dewey’s  education in logic,  the
institutions and settings in which Dewey developed his earliest logical ideas, as well as
Dewey’s association with certain individuals germane to his early logical development”
(15). In particular, the first chapter deals with the issue of Dewey’s indebtedness to his
fellow  pragmatists  (Charles  S. Peirce,  William  James,  and  George  H. Mead)  and  to
Charles Darwin, as well as with important moments of his philosophical development
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such as the so-called turn to Aristotle, his rediscovery of Peirce, his response to the
attacks  of  realists,  and his  encounter  with Bertrand Russell.  The second chapter  is
explicitly dedicated to Dewey’s relationship with George W. F. Hegel. In chapters 3 to 6,
Johnston offers an overview of Dewey’s logical texts of the period 1890-1916, 1916 being
the year in which the Essays in Experimental Logic were published. This part of the book
is  mainly  expository:  the  author  presents  in  a  detailed  and  clear  way  the  various
arguments that Dewey sets forth in his logical writings, with an eye to highlighting the
shifts and changes, both terminological and conceptual, that led him to progressively
distance from his early formulations. Finally, chapter 7 tackles the issue of the specific
differences  that  distinguish  Dewey’s  Logic:  Theory  of  Inquiry  from his  earlier  works.
Johnston speaks of ‘four pressing concerns’ that are distinctive of Dewey’s later logical
theory: these are the turn to experience; the discovery of the biological and social-
cultural matrices of inquiry; the relationship of scientific inquiry to social inquiry and
to  common-sense;  the  interrelationships  amongst  the  tools  and  techniques  within
inquiry  (198).  These  four  concerns  are  interpreted  by  Johnston  as  four  different
problems that Dewey did not succeed in solving in his earlier logical texts, since they
could be appropriately addressed only in the context of his mature philosophy.
3 The adjective ‘earlier,’ which appears in the title of the book, plays therefore a twofold
function. On the one hand, it has a purely descriptive role: it defines the period which is
the subject-matter  of  Johnston’s  historical  reconstruction (1890-1916).  On the other
hand,  it  performs  a  sort  of interpretative  function:  it  indicates  that  Dewey’s  early
logical theory should be interpreted in the light of his later views, with the aim to show
how the latter actually came out from the former. The second function can be better
formulated in terms of the couple discontinuity/continuity. Johnston’s concern is that
of understanding the development of Dewey’s logical thought without ironing out the
differences between what comes before and what comes after. In order to do that, the
author adopts what may be called a ‘differential’ and ‘incremental’ method: he focuses
on  the  problems  that  Dewey  tries  to  face  in  his  writings,  and  shows  that  Dewey’s
thought is constantly evolving toward more accurate accounts of logical inquiry. Such
an approach relies on the idea that Dewey’s later logical theory is sounder than his
earlier formulations – an interpretative hypothesis which I think very few interpreters
will venture to dispute. In doing so, Johnston succeeds in acknowledging the autonomy
of both the earlier and the later logical theories, as well as their independence of one
another.
4 Johnston’s genetic approach has the merit  of  counteracting the ‘marginalization’  of
Dewey’s logical development, and of conceiving of the Logic: The Theory of Inquiry not as
‘an ahistorical document,’ but rather as the results of a series of theoretical decisions
that Dewey made in the course of 40 years of philosophical research. Johnston invites
us to ‘take Dewey at his word’ when he says, in the opening pages of his Logic,  that
“[t]he  present  work  is  marked  in  particular  by  application  of  the  earlier  ideas  to
interpretation of the forms and formal relations that constitute the standard material
of logical tradition” (LW 12: 3; quoted at 221). In other words, Johnston suggests that we
should  read  Dewey’s  logical  development  as  stemming  from  an  original,  essential
commitment to a set of ideas that profoundly affected the way in which he thought
about  logical  issues.  According  to  Johnston,  this  set  of  ideas  comes  from  Dewey’s
confrontation with Hegelian philosophy.
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5 As is well known, in his autobiographical essay “From Absolutism to Experimentalism”
Dewey states that Hegel left a permanent deposit in his thought. Much has been written
on  this  issue:  Johnston  takes  Dewey’s  autobiographical  sketch  as  a  reliable
historiographical hypothesis, and argues that Hegel rather than James, Peirce, Mead or
Darwin should be acknowledged as the most important influence on Dewey’s logical
theory. I think that Johnston’s argument is sound and convincing. I think he is right in
remarking that the early Dewey (especially during the 1890s) attempted to naturalize
Hegel, and I completely agree with him when he writes that:
the dialectic of Hegel […] was taken by Dewey and transformed into a functional
account of inquiry in which movement from a whole (an experience) results in a
problem  (negation)  requiring  reflection  upon  the  elements  of  the  problematic
situation  (the  examination  of  the  shape  of  Spirit’s  particular  or  moments)  and
reflection  upon  the  salient  elements  that  will  make  the  situation  different  or
satisfactory (the realization of its opposite as both opposite and self) resulting in a
reestablished, reconstructed, qualitatively satisfactory whole. (72)
6 I  have quoted this  passage in its  entirety not  only because,  to  my knowledge,  it  is
probably  the  clearest  formulation of  Dewey’s  critical  appropriation of  the  Hegelian
legacy, but also because it highlights that many themes of Dewey’s philosophy, that are
usually traced back to the influence exerted on him by Peirce and James are, in reality,
traces of his Hegelian heritage. This is a significant result of Johnston’s work, which has
important consequences for the overall image of Dewey’s thought: indeed, to say that
the Deweyan notion of reconstruction is indebted to Hegel’s account of conflict has the
effect of downplaying the importance of the pragmatist tradition for the formulation of
his logical theory. Johnston correctly maintains that Dewey realizes only late in his life
that he and Peirce were ‘fellow travelers,’  and that Peirce’s logical work could be a
source  for  his  own  reflections  on  that  issue,  despite  the  former’s  interest  in
mathematical,  formal  logic.  Similarly,  Johnston  argues  that  there  is  no  particular
contribution of  James  to  Dewey’s  logic:  “I  submit  that  nothing specific  from James
contributed  to  Dewey’s  development  of  logical  theory  from  1890  on.”  Even  the
importance of Darwin, who is usually regarded as a major influence on Dewey, should
be reassessed.  As  Johnston convincingly  remarks,  “scholars  have overestimated the
influence of Darwin on Dewey”: even though many concepts that are central to Dewey’s
theory of logic are couched in Darwinian language (adaptation, adjustment, evolution,
and so on) “Dewey’s use of Darwin is not basic to his logical theory” since the logical
movement of transformation and reconstruction is “manifestly Hegelian” (32).
7 Even  though  I  do  not  agree  with  all  the  details  in  Johnston’s  historiographical
reconstruction – I think, for instance, that something more has to be said about the
influence of  James on Dewey’s  logical  theory –  I  believe that  his  attempt to  find a
proper place for Dewey’s thought in the broader context of 19th century philosophy is
worthy  of  serious  consideration.  Johnston  invites  us  to  see  Dewey’s  philosophy  in
continuity  with  the  European post-Kantian tradition,  and,  by  stressing  its  Hegelian
roots, he provides a general and comprehensive framework for interpretation. More
clearly stated: I read Johnston’s argument as a significant step towards the definition of
a  paradigm of historiographical  research based on the assumption that,  in  the last
decades  of  the  19th century,  Hegel’s  philosophy represented a  sort  of  lingua  franca
shared  by  American  and  European  philosophers.  This  transatlantic  philosophical
community was held together by a substantive agreement on the problems to be solved
and on the means to be employed. Consequently,  the different logical theories that
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were formulated by different philosophers belonging to the idealistic tradition (Dewey,
Francis  H. Bradley,  Bernard  Bosanquet,  Hermann  Lotze,  Thomas  H. Green,  but  also
Benedetto  Croce)  could  be  seen  as  variations  on  a  common  Hegelian  theme.  The
definition of the general framework in which Dewey’s logical theory developed supplies
us with more powerful analytic tools. Such an enhancement of the explanatory capacity
of our historiographical account is undoubtedly a remarkable theoretical achievement.
8 At this point, however, some defects of Johnston’s approach come to the fore. To put it
boldly, it seems to me that Johnston’s historiographical work is very consistent in its
framing of the general issue of Dewey’s logical development, but – at least in some
points  –  it  lacks  of  analytical  accuracy.  For  reasons  which  are  not  difficult  to
understand, Johnston seems to be very concerned with establishing the standpoint from
which  Dewey’s  logic  can  be  profitably  investigated  (that  is,  the  persistence  of  his
Hegelian heritage),  at  the  expense  of  the  analysis  of  the  particular  moves  through
which Dewey concretely articulates his position. In the remaining part of the review, I
will therefore highlight and discuss what I deem to be the most questionable aspects of
his reconstruction of Dewey’s logical theory, with the hope that my remarks could help
to clarify some particular, specific problems that are left unexplained – or that are not
adequately explained, at least from my point of view – in Johnston, John Dewey’s Earlier
Logical Theory. In order to remain as close as possible to the spirit of the book, I will
focus  my  comments  on  three  interrelated  points,  all  of  which  revolve  around  the
relation between Hegel and Dewey.
9 First of all, I think that some of the historiographical categories employed by Johnston
are not wholly clear.  The best example is  the category of  ‘Hegelian influence.’  In a
sense, it is evident that Dewey was strongly influenced by Hegel, and that he did not
abandon his Hegel-inspired approach to logical problems even when he came to reject
the Hegelian garb in favor of a naturalistic language. I believe that nobody would be
willing to question this thesis. However, the use of the category ‘Hegelian influence’
leaves open – and partially conceals – the question of which Hegel Dewey has in mind.
We should not overlook the fact that the Hegel that we know and discuss is different
from  the  Hegel  that  Dewey  knew  and  discussed.  Dewey  read  Hegel  through  the
spectacles of his contemporary philosophical debate. Now, one of the greatest problems
with which he was concerned was that of distancing himself from the standard version
of neo-Hegelianism that was highly influential at his time. What he found untenable in
that position was precisely the idea of a coincidence of logic and metaphysics. As is well
known, he rejected that view in the articles “Psychology as Philosophic Method” and
“The  Psychological  Standpoint” (1886),  where  he  advocated  that  psychology  rather
than logic should be acknowledged as the real method of philosophy. In a sense, this is
the ‘prehistory’ of Dewey’s logic: his parting of the ways with Hegelianism took place in
1880s, four years before Dewey published his first articles on logical topics. However,
since  it  set  the  stage  for  his  later  logical  work,  it  would  have  been  interesting  if
Johnston had dealt with that phase of Dewey’s philosophical development in his book. 
10 The previous remarks lead directly to another point that I consider problematic. I think
that Johnston gives too much emphasis to the importance of Hegel’s Phenomenology of
Spirit  for  Dewey’s  philosophy.  In  many  passages  of  his  book,  Johnston  draws
comparison  between  some  of  Dewey’s  logical  ideas  and  some  figures  of  the
Phenomenology  of  Spirit.  So,  for  instance,  at  page 101  Johnston  writes  that  “Dewey
develops a conclusion Hegel draws in the Phenomenology of Spirit,” and than he quotes a
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long  passage  from the  essay  “The  Relationship  of  Thought  and  its  Subject-Matter”
which runs as follows: “Reflection follows so naturally upon its appropriate cue, its
issue is so obvious, so practical, the entire relationship is so organic, that once [we]
gran the position that thought arises in reaction to specific demand, and there is not
the particular type of thinking called logical theory because there is not the practical
demand” (MW 2: 300; quoted at 101). I do not want to deny that Dewey draws heavily
from Hegel in this passage, even though I must admit that, in this particular case, I
cannot see the specific Hegelian contribution. This is not the point. The point is that
Johnston does not provide any evidence in support of his reading. Johnston does not
limit himself to stating that Dewey develops a conclusion previously drawn by Hegel;
he specifies that that conclusion has been formulated in the Phenomenology of Spirit. On
what grounds can he justifiably make this claim? Why the Phenomenology and not the
Logic or the Encyclopaedia? 
11 Johnston’s  argument  turns  out  to  be  even  more  puzzling  when  one  considers  the
almost complete absence of any reference, in Dewey’s work, to Hegel’s Phenomenology of
Spirit.  In  his  early  writings  Dewey  discusses  at  length  Hegel’s  Lesser  Logic  and  the
Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences; on the contrary, he almost never mentions the
Phenomenology  of  Spirit.  Even  in  his  1897  Lecture  on  Hegel, Dewey  refers  to  the
Phenomenology of Spirit only once, in the context of a discussion of Hegel’s opposition to
Friedrich  Schelling  (Dewey  2010:  111).  The  other  two  occurrences  of  the  term
‘phenomenology’ (120, and 131) refer to the section of the Encyclopaedia bearing that
name.  As  most  of  his  contemporaries,  Dewey  was  an  attentive  reader  of  the
Encyclopaedia: he was interested less in the science of the development of consciousness
than in the systematic aspect of Hegel’s philosophy. This is a fact, even though a
strange one: to our eyes, indeed, it is difficult to understand why Dewey did not prefer
the Phenomenology of Spirit over the Logic (or the Encyclopaedia) since the former bears
strong similarities to his own philosophical project. From our point of view, it would
have  been  more  natural  for  Dewey  to  adopt  Hegel’s  phenomenological  approach.
However, the events did not play out as we would have expected them to; simply, we
should  be  humble,  and acknowledge  that  this  is  one  of  the  cases  in  which history
surprises us. Otherwise, if we decide not to respect the way in which Dewey actually
read and understood Hegel, our historical reconstruction turns out to be either too
impressionistic or too speculative.
12 The appeal to humility is also relevant in another sense. I have remarked above that I
do not consider the historiographical category of ‘Hegelian influence’ wholly legitimate
because of its lack of clearness. However, this is not the only problem that 
I have with the use of this category. Another problem is that its explanatory power is
too strong and, in the last analysis,  uncontrolled;  it  synthesizes too many elements
under one simple concept. I will try to clarify this point with an example. I think that
one of the greatest merits of Johnston’s book is that of defining in an appropriate way
the problem of the origin of Dewey’s logic. Usually, the fact that Dewey was concerned
with logical issues is taken for granted, as if it were somehow natural and necessary
that he should develop a theory of logic. On the contrary, Johnston raises the question:
why did Dewey start writing on logical issues in 1890? He writes: 
While  his  [Dewey’s]  motives  for  both  psychology  and  psychology  seem  plain
enough,  the  same  cannot  be  said  of  Dewey’s  motives  for  embarking  on  an
examination of logic. For, he could have (along with Wundt) restricted himself to
empirical-physiological  psychology.  Or  he  could  have  restricted  himself  to  the
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experimental  psychology  of  James.  But  he  didn’t.  He  decided  to  tackle  logical
theory, bearing his first (written) fruits in 1890. (17)
13 His answers to that question is that Dewey started reflecting on logical issues when he
realized that a proper understanding of the nature of logic was necessary to his theory
of psychology. About the relation between psychology and logic, Johnston remarks: “I
surmise  it  is  the  need for  a  method that  concerns  Dewey:  a  method of  systematic
collection and ordering of knowledge” (18).  I  think that this answer is substantially
correct – it is correct to say that, to understand the origin of Dewey’s logic, one has to
take into consideration his particular conception of psychology – and I believe that if
Johnston had articulated it in a more straightforwardly, his interpretation of Dewey’s
logical development would have been more precise and consistent. In my opinion, the
unsatisfactory part of his reconstruction is that, when it comes down to explaining how
Dewey  concretely  reshaped  his  conceptual  apparatus  to  find  room  for  his  logical
theory, Johnston relies on the notion of idealism and ‘Hegelian influence’ – he speaks of
an “idealism that takes empirical psychology seriously” (18) – and, in doing so, he puts
the cart before the horse. It is true that Dewey’s turn to Hegel is the solution – actually,
a great part of the solution – to the problem of the origin of his logical theory, but this
implies  that  the writings prior  to  1890 (in particular,  his  Psychology)  should not  be
treated as genuinely Hegelian – at least for what concerns logic (in the sense in which
Dewey  conceives  of  logic).  If  it  were  so,  that  is  if  there  were  a  strong  continuity
between the pre-1890 and the post-1890 texts, it would be difficult to understand why
Dewey decided to abandon the ‘psychological’  description of  the different stages of
thought formulated in his Psychology in favor of a logical theory revolving around the
idea of the reconstructive function of the activity of thinking.
14 This is why I think that Johnston should have paid more attention to what I have called
above the ‘prehistory’  of  Dewey’s  logic.  Dewey’s  move to logical  instrumentalism is
more complicated than how it is commonly portrayed; it entails several minor changes
on a terminological level which goes hand in hand with more general transformations
of the philosophical landscape, so to say. Not all of these changes and transformations
can be traced back to the unquestionable influence of Hegel on Dewey. One of these
steps  towards  instrumentalism  is  the  adoption  of  Bradley’s  distinction  between
existence and meaning in 1886; another step is the analysis of the relations between
perception and conception – it is not by chance that Dewey wrote an article on this
issue, entitled “How Do Concepts Arise from Percepts” (1891), and it is strange that
Johnston does not  discuss  it  in  the third chapter of  his  book,  explicitly  devoted to
Dewey’s earliest views on logic. The distinction between perception and conception is
intrinsically  related  to  the  Kantian  issue  of  the  synthesis  of  intuition  and
understanding  in  a  judgment,  as  well  as  to  the  issue  of  the  validity  of  James’
conceptualist  theory  of  concepts.  It  is  only  in  the  light  of  this  complex  net  of
conceptual relations that the philosophical import of Dewey’s turn to Hegel becomes
fully  understandable.  In  other  words,  the  category  of  ‘Hegelian  influence’  is
historiographically valuable when it is not used in a wholesale way.
15 As a final  remark,  I  would like to stress that all  that I  have been saying about the
weaknesses  –  or, better  said,  what  I  deem  to  be  the  weaknesses  –  of  Johnston’s
approach is not intended to downplay the importance of his work. John Dewey’s Earlier
Logical Theory is an interesting and thought-provoking book that opens new pathways
for understanding Dewey’s philosophy. I hope that my previous considerations will be
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read less as  a criticism than as an attempt to contribute to the clarification of  the
problem of the origin of Dewey’s logical theory.
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